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ABSTRACT I analyze a game-theoretic model of commit-
tee–legislature interaction in which a majority decision to
adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs fol-
lowing the committee’s proposal of a bill. I find that, in
equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the
dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the differ-
ence between the equilibrium outcome and that which would
have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.
Congressional scholars are in widespread agreement that the
first nontrivial stage of the lawmaking process is committee
action on legislation introduced by members and referred by
the chamber’s parliamentarian. For major legislation in the
House of Representatives, a key ingredient in this process is
the special order or, in more common terms, the rule, which,
among other things, can limit the number and scope of
allowable changes to any bill reported out of committee. In
terms of constraints on amendments, rules range from the
closed rule, in which no amendments are allowed, to the open
rule, in which any and all (germane) amendments are allowed.
Such rules are bill-specific and do not take effect automati-
cally: Subsequent to the reporting of a bill, the Rules Com-
mittee makes a recommendation on the appropriate rule. This
rule is then subject to majority approval prior to the House
taking up the legislation to which the rule applies.
The adoption of restrictive (i.e., nonopen) rules in the House
has seen a dramatic increase in the last two decades, from 15%
in the late 1970s to 70% in the early 1990s (1). The theoretical
literature on the use of such rules has sought to understand
why a majority would willingly constrain its ability to amend
legislation produced by a committee whose interests need not
necessarily coincide with those of the legislature. One of the
more popular explanations comes from the structure-induced
equilibrium approach, which views restrictive rules either as
devices for avoiding the chaos that would presumably occur
under the open rule (2) or as part of an institutional arrange-
ment for exchanging support across the various committee
jurisdictions (3). A competing explanation asserts that restric-
tive rules will, in certain situations, provide greater incentives
for a committee to both acquire relevant information and to
signal such information through its choice of bill (4) (see ref.
5 for a review of these and other theories of legislative
institutions).
While different in many respects, the structure-induced and
informational approaches have in common a pair of critical
features, the alteration of which provides the focus of the
current paper. The first is that they typically have the legisla-
ture voting on the amendment rule prior to the bill being
delivered by the committee, in contrast to the actual practice
in Congress described above (see refs. 6 and 7 for exceptions,
the former structure-induced and the latter informational).
Hence, one of my motivations is to analyze a more descriptively
accurate model of the process by which legislation in Congress
is actually produced.
The second common feature has to do with structural
assumptions on the set of possible outcomes or policies the
legislature might enact. The existing models are examples of
“spatial” models in which the policy domain is assumed to be
a compact and convex set in some finite dimensional Euclidean
space. Thus, for instance, the domain could be the interval [0,
M] and so be one-dimensional, which might usefully model
situations in which the policy under consideration is, for
example, spending on health care or the size of a particular
defense project (with M being the maximum feasible amount
of each). Or the domain might be the set of all k non-negative
real numbers adding up to M, with the policy choice being how
to distribute a budget of M among k different programs; the
policy dimension here would then be k 2 1. Nearly all
structure-induced and informational models assume the policy
dimension is equal to one whereas here I will allow this
dimension to be arbitrary so as to cover a wider class of
environments.
For reasons of analytical tractability, my model, like most
others in the literature, limits the choice of amendment rules
to the two extremes, namely, the open rule and the closed rule,
and assumes a single-member committee. Further, decision
making under the open rule is modeled here as an explicit
bargaining process among the legislators; in particular, results
from the bargaining model found elsewhere (“A Bargaining
Model of Collective Choice,” J.B. and J. Duggan, unpublished
work) (which generalizes the model in ref. 8) are employed.
While an admittedly crude description of what actually goes on
under the open rule, as will be seen, I only require a few of the
qualitative results from the bargaining model for my general
conclusions to hold.
I find that, in equilibrium, it is almost always the case that
the bills considered by the legislature are assigned the closed
rule when the policy dimension is .1 (where ‘‘almost always’’
is given a mathematically precise definition). The underlying
logic of this result is that, with multiple dimensions, the
committee has the flexibility to craft a bill in such a way as to
avoid the imposition of an open rule and subsequently having
its bill altered through amendments. This f lexibility is notice-
ably absent in the one-dimensional case, which leaves the
equilibrium prediction more opaque: There exist equilibria in
which the open rule is adopted, but this need not be true of all
equilibria.
The model also sheds light on the effect of restrictive rules
on policy outcomes. It might be thought that the use of such
rules necessarily leads to a significant policy bias in favor of the
committee and at the expense of the legislature’s interests
(however defined). Here, on the other hand, since the amend-
ment rule is voted on after the bill is proposed, the outcome
that would occur under the open rule acts as a constraint on
the degree to which the committee can bias the bill toward its
preferred outcome. In fact, I show by way of example that the
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difference between the equilibrium bill, which receives the
closed rule and is subsequently accepted, and the policy that
would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily
small. This suggests that merely observing the closed rule being
employed is not sufficient to infer any substantial degree of
bias in legislative outcomes.
The Model
Let X , 5d denote a nonempty, compact, and convex set of
feasible policies, N 5 {1, . . . , n} the set of legislators, with
n $ 3 and odd, and let each i [ N have preferences on X
representable by a smooth and strictly concave utility function
ui : X 3 5. Let xi denote the unique solution to max{ui(x) :
x [ X}, referring to this as i’s ideal policy, and assume the
utilities u 5 (u1, . . . , un) are common knowledge among the
members of N. Let s [ X denote the status quo policy and c [
N a distinguished member of the legislature we refer to as the
committee.
A policy is chosen from the set X according to the following
procedure (see Fig. 1): Initially, c proposes a bill b [ X
(decision node B), after which a motion is automatically
brought forth on whether the bill should be considered (de-
cision node M). All i [ N vote on this motion, and, if the
motion fails to receive a majority, the process ends with the
status quo policy s remaining in place. If the motion receives
a majority, a second vote is taken, on whether the bill should
be considered under the open or the closed rule (decision node
R). If a majority votes is favor of the closed rule, the bill b is
paired against the status quo s in a final vote (decision node F),
with a majority determining the outcome. If, on the other
hand, the open rule is adopted, members of N are assumed to
bargain over the final policy. This bargaining process is mod-
eled as a discrete time, infinite horizon game in which each
period i [ N is recognized as proposer with probability ri .
0; when recognized, i makes a proposal p [ X, and then all j [
N vote either to accept or to reject p. If a majority accepts, then
the process ends with p being implemented; otherwise, the
process moves to the next period. The payoff to i [ N from x [
X being implemented after t periods of bargaining is simply
equal to ui(x); that is, legislators do not discount future
payoffs.
The collective decision-making procedure outlined above
generates a noncooperative, extensive form game of complete
information among the members of N. From the set of Nash
equilibria (9) to this game, I identify a subset of strategy
profiles satisfying various appealing properties. For conve-
nience, I partition the description of strategies and equilibrium
behavior into (i) the bargaining subgame following a vote to
adopt the open rule, and (ii) the rest of the game, under the
assumption that behavior in the former is independent of
behavior in the latter (this assumption is nontrivial if there are
multiple equilibria in the bargaining subgame). In the bar-
gaining subgame, a history of length l identifies all that has
transpired in previous bargaining periods (who the previous
proposers were, what they proposed, how individuals voted) as
well as whether, in the current period, the process stands prior
to the proposer being recognized, after such recognition but
prior to the proposal being made, or after the proposal but
prior to the vote. Therefore, in general, a strategy for a player
will be a map specifying her intended action (what to propose,
how to vote) as a function of the history to date. I focus here
only on equilibria in stationary strategies, and so, to avoid
irrelevant generality, I provide a formal definition only of such
strategies. A stationary strategy for i [ N consists of a proposal
pi [ X offered anytime i is recognized and an acceptance rule
ai : X 3 {accept, reject} specifying which proposals she
accepts. It turns out that mixed proposals are required to prove
existence of equilibria in the bargaining game; that is, an
individual randomizes over which alternative to propose (how-
ever, at the voting stage individuals observe the realized
proposal). Let P(X) denote the set of (Borel) probability
measures on X, endowed with the topology of weak conver-
gence, and let pi [ P(X) be a stationary mixed proposal for
i. Thus, bi 5 (pi, ai) constitutes a stationary strategy for i in
the bargaining subgame, and b 5 (b1, . . . , bn) constitutes a
profile of stationary strategies.
A profile b* constitutes an equilibrium of the bargaining
subgame if, for all i [ N, (i) p*i is optimal given the acceptance
rules (a*1, . . . , a*n) of the others, and (ii) a*i is optimal given
that b* describes what would happen subsequent to the current
proposal being rejected. Specifically, condition (ii) requires
that i’s vote on a proposal x [ X depend on which is greater,
ui(x) or her continuation value, defined as her expected utility
if the current proposal is rejected. By stationarity and the
assumption of no discounting, this value is simply equal to her
expected utility under the profile b*; with some abuse of
notation, denote this ui(b*) and assume that, when ui(x)
equals ui(b*), i votes in favor of x. Condition (i) requires that,
when recognized, i place positive probability only on utility-
maximizing proposals from those acceptable to a majority,
with strict concavity of the utility functions implying both that
there will always exist proposals acceptable to a majority and
that i prefers to offer some acceptable proposal to having her
proposal be rejected. Hence, in any equilibrium, the first
proposal offered will be accepted, with the location of this
proposal potentially depending on the identity of the proposer.
Further, the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set
of equilibrium proposals.
Embedded in these conditions are two refinements of the
Nash equilibrium concept. The first is found in both (i) and (ii)
and requires that proposals and voting be optimal after any
possible history of the game, not just the equilibrium history;
this is known as subgame perfection (10). Thus, for example,
even if the first proposer offers something other than what was
expected, individuals’ first-period voting behavior should be
optimal given the prediction that future proposals (and voting)
will play out according to the equilibrium strategies. The
second is found only in (ii), and stems from the fact that in
majority voting over a pair of alternatives there exist Nash
equilibria in which individuals vote for a common alternative
regardless of their preferences. Such behavior is consistent
with Nash by the fact that, if a majority is already voting in
favor of one alternative, any one individual’s vote cannot effect
the outcome; hence, they are indifferent and so find it optimal
FIG. 1. The sequence of decisions: a pair D,I lists, respectively, the
decision nodes’ label (B, M, R, or F), and the individuals involved in
the decision (c or N).
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to go along with the majority. On the other hand, an individ-
ual’s weakly dominant strategy in such a game is to vote for her
preferred alternative, owing to the possibility that the others
will split their votes between the two, thereby rendering her
pivotal: that is, her vote is decisive in determining the outcome.
Thus, (ii) requires each i [ N to consider themselves pivotal
in the vote on whether to accept a proposal.
For the remainder of the game, a strategy for i [ N in-
cludes three voting rules, vi 5 (vi
m, vi
r, v i
f), specifying, respec-
tively, (i) how i votes on the motion to consider the bill b
proposed by c; (ii) how i votes with respect to the open vs.
closed rule, as a function of the bill b and the vote on the
motion to consider; and (iii) how i votes on final passage under
the closed rule, as a function of the bill b, the vote on the
motion to consider, and the vote on the amendment rule. As
in the bargaining subgame, the equilibrium conditions on the
voting rules embody the notions of subgame perfection and
weak dominance, in the form of sophisticated voting (11)
(which is equivalent to iteratively deleting dominated strate-
gies). An advantage here is that, once an equilibrium b* for the
bargaining subgame has been selected and so the utilities
{ui(b*)}i[N are well defined, the game becomes one of a finite
length. Thus, I can solve for the equilibrium strategies of the
players for the remainder of the game by first solving for the
optimal behavior at decision node F and then working back-
wards up the (collective) decision tree. On a vote between b
and s at node F, i bases her decision on the relative values of
ui(b) and ui(s) (by weak dominance), with indifference as-
sumed to favor b. On a vote between the open and closed rules
at node R, her decision is based on ui(b*) and either ui(b) or
ui(s), depending on whether b or s is predicted to prevail at
node F; refer to this as the sophisticated equivalent outcome
at node F, and note that common knowledge of u implies each
i [ N can perfectly predict this outcome. If indifferent at
decision node R, I assume i votes for the closed rule. On the
motion to consider, her decision is based on ui(s) and one of
{ui(b*), ui(b), ui(s)}, depending on the sophisticated equiv-
alent outcome at node R (b*, b, or s, respectively), which again
i can perfectly predict. If the sophisticated equivalent outcome
at R is b Þ s and i is indifferent between s and b, I assume she
votes in favor of the motion whereas if the sophisticated
equivalent outcome at R is s, I assume she votes against the
motion. To these behavioral assumptions, I add the preference
assumption that, for all i [ N, ui(s) Þ ui(b*), so that (because
n is odd) there exists a majority that either strictly prefers s to
b* or else strictly prefers b* to s.
Finally, given a profile of equilibrium voting strategies v* 5
(v*1, . . . , v*n) and bargaining strategies b* 5 (b*1, . . . , b*n), the
committee c [ N can solve for the resulting policy associated
with any bill b [ X she could propose; denote this policy x(b;
v*, b*). I require her to make a utility-maximizing choice of
bill; that is, b* should solve
max$uc~x~b; v*, b*!! : b [ X%.
Equilibrium Behavior
I begin with a description of three qualitative properties of
equilibria in the bargaining subgame, properties which, while
not completely characterizing equilibrium behavior there, are
nevertheless sufficient for the tasks at hand. Two of the three
properties are related to the majority rule core associated with
the utility profile u, defined as
K~u! 5 $x [ X : ’y y [ X s.t .u$i [ N : ui~y! . ui~x!%u . ny2%.
Thus, a policy is in K(u) if no majority can find an alternative
they all prefer to it. Since ui(.) is strictly concave for all i [ N
and n is odd, the core K(u) is either empty or a singleton;
denote this unique core point by x*. When d 5 1, the ‘‘median
voter theorem’’ (12) states that K(u) is nonempty for all u, with
x* equal to the median of the legislators’ ideal policies. On the
other hand, if d . 1, the necessary conditions on u to
guarantee the nonemptiness of K(u) are quite severe; I take up
this issue in more detail below (for more on the core see ref.
13). A proof of the following result can be found elsewhere
(J.B. and J. Duggan, unpublished work):
LEMMA 1. In the bargaining subgame, (a) there exists an
equilibrium b*; (b) p1 5 . . . 5 p*n 5 p* is an equilibrium if and
only if p* 5 x*; (c) If d 5 1, then the unique equilibrium is where
p*1 5 . . . 5 p*n 5 x*.
By Lemma 1(a), there exists an equilibrium to the bargaining
subgame for any profile u of utilities, and, therefore, (selecting
any one if there are multiple equilibria) the utilities
{ui(b*)}i[N associated with selecting the open rule are well
defined. By Lemma 1(b), the only time it is an equilibrium for
all individuals to make the same proposal is when there exists
a majority rule core point; further, everyone proposing this
point constitutes an equilibrium. There may exist other equi-
libria; however, Lemma 1(c) says that, when the policy dimen-
sion is one, this ‘‘core’’ equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
I turn next to a characterization of the equilibrium behavior
at the voting stages. Fix an equilibrium b* in the bargaining
subgame, and let x(b*) denote the expected outcome gener-
ated by b*:
x~b*! 5 O
i[N
riFE
X
xp*i~dx!G .
Since each ui is strictly concave, ui(x(b*)) $ ui(b*) for all i [
N, with this inequality strict unless all equilibrium proposals
coincide. Next, define
Ao~u! 5 $x [ X : u$i [ N : ui~x! $ ui~b*!%u . ny2%
as the set of policies that are weakly preferred by a majority to
the utility associated with the open rule. This set will be
nonempty (in particular, x(b*) [ Ao(u)) and compact (by the
continuity of the uis). Likewise, define
As~u! 5 $x [ X : u$i [ N : ui~x! $ ui~s!%u . ny2%
as the set of policies that are weakly preferred by a majority to
the status quo; this set will as well be nonempty (s [ As(u))
and compact.
Our next result is an immediate application of the sophis-
ticated voting logic described above:
LEMMA 2. (a) If b [ Ao(u) ø As(u), the sophisticated voting
outcome is b; (b) if b ‚ Ao(u) ø As(u), the sophisticated voting
outcome is the majority-preferred choice from {s, b*}.
In particular, as I assume that when s is the sophisticated
equivalent outcome at R individuals simply reject the motion
to consider the only time the closed rule is adopted is when the
committee proposes a bill that majority-defeats both the status
quo and the open rule.
To see that an optimal policy choice b* for c always exists
and, hence, that I have existence of equilibria for the entire
game, first note that the set Ao(u) ø As(u) is always nonempty;
this follows since x(b*) [ Ao(u) and s [ As(u), and so, if a
majority weakly prefers x(b*) to s, the former will be in As(u),
and conversely. Next, since the intersection of compact sets is
compact, the continuous function uc(.) achieves a maximum
on the set Ao(u) ø As(u) by Weierstrass’ Theorem; denote this
maximum v#(u). Therefore, c’s choice of optimal proposal
reduces to two options: choose (optimally) from Ao(u) ø As(u)
and receive v#(u) or choose from outside of Ao(u) ø As(u) and
receive either uc(b*) or uc(s), depending on which of b* and
s is majority-preferred to the other. Among these two options,
one will obviously give at least as high a utility as the other, and
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so, an optimal choice b* for c always exists. Note that, since
A,o(u) ø As(u) need not be convex, even when c prefers to
choose from this set, her utility-maximizing choice need not be
unique; therefore, we may have multiple equilibria.
Finally, I turn to identifying when b* will lie in Ao(u) ø
As(u), thereby [via Lemma 2(a)] triggering the adoption of the
closed rule by the legislature. If I can show that there exists a
policy in Ao(u) ø As(u) that gives the committee a strictly
higher payoff than that from the majority-preferred choice
between s and b*, so too must c’s optimal proposal from within
this set give a strictly higher payoff, implying b* [ Ao(u) ø
As(u). Thus, in what follows, I can simply focus on identifying
when such better proposals exist. The answer turns out to
depend on whether the core K(u) is empty or not and, when
empty, on which of b* and s is majority-preferred to the other.
Write b*Ps for when b* is majority-preferred to s, and
similarly define sPb*.
If K(u) 5 À, then, by Lemma 1(b), the equilibrium proposals
(and, hence, the outcomes) cannot all coincide, and so
ui(x(b*)) . ui(b*) for all i [ N. Furthermore, if b*Ps, then
ui(b*) . ui(s) for a majority of individuals. Therefore, x(b*)
is in As(u); and, since uc(x(b*)) . uc(b*), c’s optimal proposal
b* will be in Ao(u) ø As(u), and the closed rule will be
adopted.
Next, suppose K(u) 5 À but sPb*. The analysis here depends
on whether the following condition holds:
’ y [ As~u!, y Þ s, s.t . uc~y! $ uc~s!;
equivalently, there exists a coalition L # N such that uLu . ny2,
c [ L, and ui(y) $ ui(s) for all i [ L. For any a [ (0, 1), define
za 5 as 1 (1 2 a)y; by strict concavity, ui(za) . ui(s) for all
i [ L and all a [ (0, 1), and so za is in As(u) for all a [ (0,
1). Since sPb*, by continuity za will be in Ao(u) for a
sufficiently close to 1. Hence, there exists a [ (0, 1) such that
za [ Ao(u) ø As(u) and uc(za) . uc(s), implying as above that
b* [ Ao(u) ø As(u), and, in equilibrium, the closed rule is
adopted.
Conversely, suppose the above condition is not satisfied; that
is, for all y [ As(u), y Þ s, uc(y) , uc(s). This implies s 5
argmax{uc(x) : x [ Ao(u) ø As(u)}, and so c is indifferent
between proposing b 5 s and proposing any b ‚ Ao(u) ø
As(u). Thus, the equilibrium outcome will be equal to s, with
the voting assumption above implying that the motion to
consider is denied.
We can actually turn the above condition into a ‘‘core’’-type
of condition: define the c-core, Kc(u), as
Kc~u! 5 $x [ X : ’y ~y, L! s.t . uLu
. ny2, c [ L & ui~y! . ui~x! ; i [ L%.
Thus, elements of Kc(u) are such that no majority coalition
including c can find a preferred alternative. The above con-
dition is then satisfied precisely when s is not in Kc(u), and so
c can find a majority (including herself) that prefers some
movement away from the status quo.
What we have shown, then, is the following:
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose K(u) 5 À. (a) If b*Ps, then, in every
equilibrium, the closed rule is adopted and the committee’s bill is
accepted; (b) if sPb* and s ‚ Kc(u), then, in every equilibrium,
the closed rule is adopted and the committee’s bill is accepted; (c)
if sPb* and s [ Kc(u), then, in every equilibrium, the motion to
consider is denied.
Thus, when the core is empty, any committee bill considered
by the legislature, that is, for which the motion to consider is
approved, is assigned the closed rule. From above, I know that,
when d 5 1, the core is nonempty for all utility profiles, and
so this result is not relevant when the policy dimension equals
one. On the other hand, when d . 1, the core can be empty,
and, indeed, existing results show that it is empty for ‘‘almost
all’’ utility profiles.
In ref. 14, core emptiness is addressed under the assumption
that utility functions are strictly quasiconcave, a weaker con-
dition than the strict concavity assumed here. It is shown that,
when d . 1, the core is empty on the interior of X for an open
and dense set of utility profiles under the Whitney C‘ topology
[a similar conclusion holds on the boundary of X when d . 2
and this boundary is smooth (15)]. That is, if K(u) 5 À, then
there exists an open set U of utility profiles containing u such
that K(u9) 5 À for all u9 [ U; and, if K(u) Þ À, then, for all
open sets U of utility profiles containing u, there exists u9 [
U such that K(u9) 5 À. Here, I have a subset of the allowable
profiles considered in ref. 14; yet, one can show that the core
is almost always empty on this restricted class of profiles (under
the relative topology) as well. Openness will be inherited from
the openness on the larger set of profiles. Denseness is not
inherited but can be shown constructively from the necessary
conditions for an alternative to be a majority rule core point
found in ref. 16. For instance, if xi Þ xj for all i, j [ N, these
conditions are met only at some individual’s ideal policy, and
then only if the remaining individuals can be paired up in such
a way as to make the utility gradients of the members of each
pair point in exactly opposite directions. If a core point exists
at xi, slightly shifting the function ui in any direction will render
the core empty.
Combining this result on the core with Proposition 1 pro-
duces our main conclusion: For almost all utility profiles, the
closed rule will be assigned to any committee bill considered
by the legislature when the policy dimension is greater than
one.
When the core is nonempty, as, for example, when the policy
dimension equals one, I know from Lemma 1(b) that there
exists an equilibrium of the bargaining game in which p*1 5 . . .
5 p*n 5 x*; furthermore, by Lemma 1(c), this is the unique
equilibrium when d 5 1. It is easily seen that, here, x* is the
only element in Ao(u) ø As(u), and so (since x* is majority-
preferred to s), regardless of what c proposes, the resulting
equilibrium outcome will be x*. Therefore, c is indifferent over
all possible bills she could propose, and, hence, b* Þ x*, with
subsequently the open rule being adopted, constitutes an
equilibrium. Of course, b* 5 x*, with then the closed rule
being adopted, is an equilibrium as well, and so we are left
without a clear prediction of rule assignment when the core is
nonempty.
One escape route from this indeterminacy is to employ a
selection argument in the spirit of trembling hand perfection
(17), in which each suboptimal strategy for an individual
receives some vanishingly small probability of being played. If
these ‘‘error’’ probabilities only occur on the vote concerning
the amendment rule, it is easily seen that c’s optimal proposal
will not be x* but instead will be some element b of As(u)
preferred by c to x*: In making such a proposal, c gains a small
but positive probability of generating b as the outcome, with
x* being the outcome under the complementary probability.
This convex combination is clearly superior to proposing x*,
which generates x* as the outcome with certainty, and so we
would resolve the above indeterminacy in favor of the open
rule. (Of course, the proper application of trembling hand
perfection requires positive errors throughout the entire
game.)
Alternatively, instead of modifying the solution concept, one
could modify slightly the committee’s preferences in the game.
Suppose that, for a fixed policy outcome, c prefers fewer stages
in the process. Thus, c, would rather propose x*, so that the
closed rule is adopted and x* is voted over s, than offer some
other policy that triggers the open rule, a new proposal (of x*),
and then a final vote. (A similar conclusion would hold if,
ceteris paribus, c prefers to offer a bill that is accepted to one
that is not.) In this case, the indeterminacy is again resolved,
8298 Political Sciences: Banks Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96 (1999)
but in the opposite direction. In fact, the prediction now would
be that the closed rule should be the only rule ever observed,
regardless of the policy dimension.
In general, then, the one-dimensional model is less clear
than its multiple dimension counterpart with regards the
amendment rule assigned to the committee’s bill. It is impor-
tant to point out, however, that this lack of determinacy with
respect to the rule assignment when d 5 1 is caused precisely
by the stark determinacy with respect to the policy outcome,
namely, the fact that, regardless of the bill proposed by c, the
resulting policy will necessarily be equal to the majority core
point, x*.
Policy Bias and the Closed Rule
From the above proposition, we see that, in multiple dimen-
sions, closed rules are almost always assigned to any com-
mittee bill considered by the legislature, with this bill
ultimately being adopted. This is the same sequence that
commonly occurs in the structure-induced equilibrium mod-
els as well (although the actual policies implemented will
most likely differ). In the current model, however, the degree
to which the committee’s bill, and, hence, the final policy,
differs from that which would have occurred under the open
rule is constrained by the fact that, by subgame perfection,
a majority must find the former to be weakly preferable to
the latter. This constraint has the effect of potentially
rendering this policy difference infinitesimal, depending on
the preferences of the legislators. I demonstrate this claim
through the use of a simple example.
Suppose each individual’s utility function is quadratic:
ui(x) 5 2ix 2 xii2, so that we can completely characterize the
preferences of each i [ N by their ideal policy xi [ X. Let
E(x1, . . . , xn) denote the set of equilibrium proposals in the
bargaining subgame when the preferences are given by
(x1, . . . , xn); thus, I can view E(.) as a correspondence from
the set of profiles of ideal points, Xn, into the set of profiles of
proposal strategies, [P(X)]n. It has been shown (J.B. and J.
Duggan, unpublished work) that this correspondence is upper
hemicontinuous, so that, if {(x1
k, . . . , xn
k)}k51
‘ is a sequence of
ideal point profiles converging to (x1, . . . , xn), and {b*k}k51
‘
is a sequence of equilibria such that, for all k, I have b*k [
E(x1
k, . . . , xn
k), then there is a subsequence of {b*k}k51
‘ that
converges to some b* [ E(x1, . . . , xn).
Now, let X 5 [21, 1]2, s 5 (1, 1), n 5 3, c 5 1, and let ideal
points be x1 5 (21, 0), x2 5 (0, y), and x3 5 (1, 0). I will hold
fixed x1 and x3, and vary y in x2. Consider a sequence of ys
converging to zero, and denote by b*(y) the equilibrium in the
convergent subsequence associated with y. By Lemma 1(c), I
have a unique equilibrium in the bargaining game when y 5 0,
namely b*(0) 5 (0, 0) (since, in this instance, the origin is the
majority rule core point in one dimension), and so, by upper
hemicontinuity, b*(y) converges to (0, 0). Thus, for y suffi-
ciently close to zero, the expected outcome if the open rule
were to be adopted is close to the origin. Now, for all y Þ 0,
the majority rule core is empty, and, therefore, by Proposition
1, in equilibrium the closed rule is adopted and the commit-
tee’s proposal b*(y) is passed. To locate this proposal, note
that, since ui(b*(y)), being i’s expected utility in the equilib-
rium b*(y), is continuous in b, I have that, for all i [ N,
ui(b*(y)) is converging to ui(0, 0). But then the set of
proposals weakly preferred by individual 2 to b*(y) is con-
verging to the set {(0, 0)} (i.e., her ideal point) while the
analogous set for individual 3 is converging to {x [ X : d(x,
x3) # 1} [where d(.) denotes Euclidean distance]. Therefore,
since the committee is capturing at least one of these other
voters at each y, it must be that the committee’s proposal b*(y)
is converging to (0, 0) as well. Hence, I can make b*(y) as close
to b*(y) as I wish by choosing y suitably close to zero since each
of these sequences is converging to (0, 0).
This exercise demonstrates how the difference between the
equilibrium outcome under the closed rule and that which
would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily
small. Conversely, any argument to the effect that such a
difference is substantial must, in the current model, be pred-
icated on an additional assumption concerning the heteroge-
neity or dispersion of the individuals’ preferences.
Discussion
The analysis above has demonstrated how the dimension of the
policy space can be an important factor in determining the
amendment rule governing a committee’s bill, in that, with
multiple dimensions, we should almost always observe the
closed rule being employed. With regard to testable implica-
tions, and consciously side-stepping the issue of measuring the
policy dimension, the model thus predicts a central tendency
toward the use of closed rules when this dimension is greater
than one. However, in terms of explaining variation in the use
of restrictive rules—for example, the intertemporal variation
described in the first section—the model has less potential, as
any theoretical variation requires the selection of an ‘‘open
rule’’ equilibrium in one dimension in the presence of com-
peting arguments.
A number of extensions of the model immediately suggest
themselves, some combination of which might generate a
more significant amount of variation. The first has to do with
the bargaining model of the open rule employed here, which
looks much more like a free-for-all than the structured
procedure found in Congress. In particular, a more realistic
model of the open rule would have at least some role for the
committee’s bill, with any such role adding to the strategic
considerations of the committee in formulating an optimal
bill. Second, the current model ignores the role of the Rules
Committee, whose inf luence emanates from its ability to
propose amendment rules (in much the same way the
committee’s inf luence emanates from its ability to propose
the bill). With only two possible rules, any such inf luence is
quite limited; however, expanding the set of rules by allowing
for intermediate levels of amending would both increase this
inf luence as well as, again, provide a more accurate picture
of existing processes. Finally, it would be nice to have
multiple members of the committee, who might, for example,
engage in their own bargaining over the proposal to make it
to the f loor. The key technical difficulty with applying my
own results (J.B. and J. Duggan, unpublished work) to such
a model is that any proposal would, as here, have to lie in the
set of alternatives defeating both the status quo and the open
rule. This set will typically be nonconvex in multiple dimen-
sions whereas, in the aforementioned results, the proposal
space is required to be convex.
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